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An Investigation of Differences  in
Agricultural Expenditure by
State Government
Enrique Ospina and Ralph O.  Gunderson
Agriculture department  programs in 43 states surveyed  offer similar services in
regulation, market promotion,  and natural resource  conservation but are  organized
differently.  Two OLS equations were estimated to explain  state agriculture  department
expenditures  as a function of gross farm  sales,  farm receipts mix,  degree of
government centralization,  the proportion of metropolitan  area residents,  and tax
capacity.  A positive relation was found between state agricultural spending and gross
farm sales and the percent of fruits/vegetables farm receipts. However, the results cast
doubt over the Leviathan thesis of increasing government spending  resulting from
bureaucratic  power.
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Agricultural  analysts  devote  a  considerable
amount of time and effort to policy research-
particularly  high on research agendas  are the
impacts and implications of federal farm  pol-
icies.  However,  in recent  years  state govern-
ments' agriculture  policies  have  received in-
creased attention. Although states have always
played  important  roles,  new  interests  have
forced them to broaden their view of possible
state  policies  that  can  assist the  agricultural
sector in particular and rural economies in gen-
eral  (Batie  1988b;  Nothdurft,  Vaughan,  and
Popovich).
Analysts frequently refer to the public sector
as though there is a single  government. How-
ever,  federal  systems have  multiple layers  of
jurisdiction with separate but related functions
and taxing authority. The federal (central) gov-
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ernment  is  distinctive  from  the  states.  The
states, in turn, are differentiated from local units
of  government-counties,  townships,  cities
(Chicoine; Jahr).
As  the federal  government  struggles  to re-
duce  its budget deficit,  the elimination  of fi-
nancial  support  for  important  development
programs to agriculture and rural areas is likely
to continue. The "new federalism"  of  the 1980s
suggests  that  state  governments  participate
more actively  in deciding the  future of their
states. As a consequence, states must shoulder
a greater portion of the burden for finding so-
lutions to their own agricultural and rural woes
(Batie  1988b;  Chicoine; Jahr;  Rabe).
The first section of  this article is a discussion
of state agriculture department  programs  and
organizational structures and a sample of spe-
cific  state government  activities  affecting  the
agricultural  sector. The  second  section is de-
voted to a presentation  of the normative  and
positive schools of  thought that seek to explain
public  spending  by  government.  Finally,  an
empirical  model  based  on  1985  agricultural
spending data for a sample  of 43  states  tests
the significance of variables that represent the
normative and positive approaches to explain-
Western Journal  of Agricultural  Economics, 15(2):  291-299
Copyright  1990  Western Agricultural Economics  AssociationWestern Journal  of Agricultural  Economics
ing  the  role  of state government  in the  agri-
cultural economy.1
Programs of State Departments
of Agriculture
State  agricultural  agencies  have  myriad  re-
sponsibilities in their often dual roles as  reg-
ulatory  and service  agencies  (Gunderson and
Ospina).  As regulatory  agencies,  they enforce
federal and state laws designed to protect both
farmers and consumers. In addition, they pro-
vide valuable  services  to producers  and con-
sumers.  The use  of terms regulatory and  ser-
vice is somewhat confusing because, depending
on the  viewer's perspective,  they often repre-
sent the same  activity.  For example,  when  a
milk inspector collects samples  at a Grade A
dairy farm,  the  producer  may  view  this  in-
spection  as  government  regulation,  but  the
consumer  may  consider the same  inspection
as  a  service  provided  by  the  government  to
assure wholesome milk on the dinner table.
Most state funds spent on agricultural  pro-
grams  regulate  business  practices,  food,  and
agricultural  inputs.  Business  practice  regula-
tions, enforced through inspections, and checks
and laboratory tests, are aimed at maintaining
accurate  weights  and  measures  and  assuring
conformance  to  product  label  declarations.
Food  regulations  guarantee  wholesomeness,
proper sanitary conditions, and appropriate la-
beling  and  are  enforced  through  inspection
programs  covering  all  the  stages  of produc-
tion-from plant and  animal  disease control
in the farm to quality control of meat packages
at  the  supermarket.  Agricultural  input  regu-
lations ensure that farmers can obtain quality
materials  and  protect the  public  from  harm
caused by improper use, storage, and disposal
of such materials.
It is apparent that nonfarmers receive a sig-
nificant  portion  of the  services  provided  by
state departments  of agriculture,  as evidenced
by existing  programs to promote  farm  prod-
ucts.  Six of the  43 states surveyed  spent over
'The  states  surveyed  were:  Alabama,  Arizona, Arkansas,  Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,  Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massa-
chusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Montana,
Nebraska,  Nevada,  New Jersey,  New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,  Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina,  South Dakota, Tennessee,  Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington,  West Virginia, Wisconsin,  and Wyoming.
$1 million, while nine others spent at least $.5
million  in  market  development  and  promo-
tion during  fiscal  years  1985  or  1986.  Many
efforts  are quite  specific  such  as the Virginia
wine promotion program,  while others have a
broad  scope  such  as development  of foreign
markets (table  1). In general, state agencies act
as  facilitators  to bring buyers  and  sellers  to-
gether by providing accurate information about
prices,  quantities  available,  quality,  and  lo-
cation; by offering grading and inspection ser-
vices;  and  by  developing  cooperatives  and
farmers' markets (Popovich  1988). State gov-
ernments  also  promote their products by de-
veloping  logos such  as "Connecticut Grown"
and "Taste of Texas,"  by creating agencies to
pursue  development  of new crops, by partic-
ipating in national and international food and
agricultural  fairs,  and by  operating  domestic
and foreign offices  to seek clients in key over-
seas markets. Generally,  the levels of financial
support for these programs have increased in
recent  years  (Gunderson  and  Ospina;  Mc-
Lemore).
Other state activities range from agricultural
financing programs that have a spotty rate of
success  (Popovich  1986;  White)  to farmland
preservation  and  conservation  set-aside  pro-
grams to protect soil and  surface and ground
water resources (Batie  1988a;  Gunderson and
Ospina;  Jacobs and Taylor;  Runge).
The  economic  rationale  for the  state  agri-
cultural programs and services described above
is  varied.  In  some  cases  state  programs  are
designed to correct for the existence of exter-
nalities, for example  regulation of pesticides,
or asymmetric  patterns  of information,  such
as food labeling.  In other instances states  are
attempting to perform a stabilization function,
such as in the case of state farm financing pro-
grams.
Organizational  Structure of State
Departments of Agriculture
Departments  of agriculture  have  similar  di-
visional functions across states.  Interstate dif-
ferences in organizational  structure and in the
scope  of functions  and  operations  in the de-
partment  chief executive  exist.  In  Delaware
and New  Mexico,  for example,  the chief ag-
ricultural  official, who  is appointed,  has little
opportunity  to  develop  independent  policies
and is primarily an administrator.  In contrast,
the Georgia,  North Dakota, and  Texas  com-
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Table 1.  Expenditures for Agricultural Market Promotion, Selected  States, Fiscal Years 1985
or 1986
State  FY  Type of Program  $000
Market Development
State Farmers'  Market Authority
Montgomery  Farmers' Market
Farmers' Markets
State Export Development
Market Development and Regulation
Aquaculture
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Source: Gunderson and Ospina.
missioners of  agriculture,  who are elected, have
greater mandates that include being the leading
advocate  for the  farm  sector.  Although  it is
tempting to attribute the larger roles to elected
officials, appointed agricultural officials in Cal-
ifornia,  Connecticut,  Minnesota,  and Oregon
play important roles in agricultural policy de-
velopment and advocacy (Gunderson  and Os-
pina).
In addition,  state boards and commissions
of  agriculture set policies and design the frame-
works in which departments  and  agricultural
agencies  operate.  The  membership  of these
bodies usually represents  a diversity of inter-
ests. The way members are selected differs from
state to state,  but in most states they are ap-
pointed by the governor and confirmed by the
legislature with provisions requiring all regions
and major agricultural  interests  be represent-
ed. For example,  the Kansas  State  Board  of
Agriculture  is very populist in structure  with
a potential  membership in the hundreds.  On
the other hand, the Board of Regents  of New
Mexico  State  University  directs  agricultural
policy and activities in the state. Overall, these
bodies  have  an  opportunity  for establishing
coordination among agriculture related groups
in the public and private sectors  and for serv-
ing as forums for discussing issues  of interest
to the agricultural  community.
Arizona, Arkansas, and Indiana do not have
a central department,  board, or agency of the
state government  that has the sole responsi-
bility of responding to all agricultural interests
and problems. Despite the lack of a centralized
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services  to the agricultural  sector as do other
states  with  one difference-services  are  pro-
vided by independent agencies, each with well-
defined  objectives  and a tightly focused man-
date.
New State Interests and Initiatives
Federal government policies and the poor per-
formance of  the farm and rural economies dur-
ing the 1980s helped stimulate questions about
the adequateness  of the state public sector to
respond to emerging needs beyond the level of
traditionally  mundane  agricultural  services
such as grain elevator and commodity  inspec-
tions, grading, weights and measures, and cer-
tification.  In  this  regard  most  states  are  be-
coming  increasingly  aggressive  in  promoting
(defending) their farm economies. Three areas
are  fast  becoming  bandwagons  of state  in-
volvement: diversification,  international mar-
ket development, and value-added processing.
In all three areas the role of the state govern-
ment can be either as a facilitator-providing
information  and  assistance to interested par-
ties-or as a promoter-advertising, financing,
and actually helping market products.
Farm  output  diversification  has become  a
priority of many states such as Iowa and  Or-
egon which  are  promoting  initiatives  to  sta-
bilize farm and rural income (Gunderson and
Ospina). However, not a single comprehensive
program to integrate  diversification  as a stra-
tegic component  of agricultural  and rural de-
velopment has been designed and implement-
ed in any  state (Smith).
International  market  development,  partic-
ularly for high-value products, is another likely
arena in which states are promoting  their ag-
ricultural and rural economies. Many states are
implementing innovative programs and using
sophisticated tools to help exporters expand in
targeted overseas markets (Popovich  1988).
Value-added  processing-a  philosophy
something like, "Don't sell your grain, feed it
to the chickens;  don't sell the chickens, make
frozen  chicken nuggets,"  is an attractive  idea
because  of the potentially high  returns  addi-
tional processing of raw materials can bring to
local  economies  (Connor).  States  including
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska,  New Jersey,
and Texas  are promoting  traditional  and  in-
novative  ideas  for  value-added  processing
through a variety of programs targeted to pro-
mote industry that brings the most benefits in
terms of jobs,  income, and long-term  growth
potential  to  rural  communities  (Deaton  and
Johnson).
Given  traditional  state  farm  policies  and
newly developing farm programs in the states,
an investigation  of the  factors  "explaining"
state government  spending  is  of interest.  No
study of this subject has been published to this
date. Previous and current work in the field of
public goods,  externalities,  and public  choice
provide a rich background  for explaining  the
variations  in  government  spending  by  the
states.
The Theoretical Role of Government:
Normative and Positive Views
Normative economic analysts have pointed out
several roles that governments ought to play,
primarily  in cases  of market failure.  Of chief
importance  here  is nonrivalry  and nonexclu-
sion  in consumption  (public  goods)  and  the
existence of externalities  that hinder the  effi-
cient operation  of the marketplace.
Nonrival consumption occurs when the con-
sumption of a good or service by one individ-
ual  does  not reduce  the consumption  possi-
bilities  of  another.  A  typical  example  in
agriculture  is  provided  by  a  farmer's  cattle
which are protected from brucellosis by public
quarantine,  vaccination,  or  herd  inspection
programs.  The  benefits  the  farmer  receives
from these services  do not diminish the ben-
efits that  other farmers  obtain  because  their
cattle also are protected.
Cases of nonexclusion  occur when the pur-
chaser of a product finds that it is very costly
to exclude those who did not pay for the prod-
uct from nevertheless  consuming the product.
For example, when a farmer's taxes contribute
to financing agricultural research, the benefits
of such research are not kept from those who
paid fewer taxes or none at all.
Products that are nonrival and nonexclusive
in nature are difficult for the private sector to
produce. Once the product is available, several
consumers will benefit from it even if they pay
no price at all. Thus the product is difficult to
sell and the market is unlikely to produce it in
an  efficient quantity,  if at all, even  when  the
total benefits to consumers exceed total private
costs.  Commodity  check-off programs  orga-
nized  and implemented  by  state  commodity
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organizations are examples of ways to produce
nonrival research and market development.
Tullock's classic allegory of 100 farmers and
the dilemma of building  a needed road illus-
trates  the  inability of the market  to produce
nonrival  and  nonexclusive  goods.  Generally,
the  larger  the affected  group,  the more  diffi-
culty it will have  organizing  itself voluntarily
to provide  the  public  good.  Most  groups  in
agriculture are large, for example producer as-
sociations and cooperatives, making it difficult
for them  to  organize  production  of a  public
good among themselves.
Normative  analysis  arrives at the decision
that government should intervene in the econ-
omy in still another instance-when external-
ities occur. These are costs or benefits imposed
on uninvolved third parties due to some eco-
nomic activity.  In either case it is difficult for
private markets to operate efficiently.  An ex-
ample of  an external cost is the case of a farmer
who applies pesticides to a crop to reduce pest
damage.  The  farmer  rationally  should  apply
the chemical to the point where marginal costs
and benefits  are equal.  It is possible  that the
chemical residues are carried to a nearby stream
or eventually reach groundwater supplies thus
harming  third parties.  Since  all costs  are not
reflected  in  the market  transaction,  the gov-
ernment may establish policies to regulate the
use  of chemicals  in a more  efficient  manner
than is possible with the market.
While the existence  of public goods and(or)
externalities  provide  two  compelling  expla-
nations for government  programs, the "public
choice"  school addresses  the issue of govern-
ment intervention  from a different  direction.
Public choice theory suggests that rather than
hypothesizing what government  ought to do,
it is more instructive  to hypothesize  what ac-
tually  is being done  by government.  For  ex-
ample,  Tullock predicted  that  a political  co-
alition of 51  farmers would vote to repair the
roads.  Since  they pay  only  51%  of the  cost,
they  vote  to have  the road  maintained  at  a
higher standard than if they paid the full cost.
Tullock drew  the conclusion that a system
of  majority rule would lead to excessive spend-
ing  relative  to  the  Pareto  optimal  level  of
spending that would occur in a system of unan-
imous rule. This type of"logrolling" behavior
is  similar to  the porkbarrel  legislation  often
associated  with  interest  group  pressures  in
modem day politics. This is especially true in
agriculture.  Browne (p.  9) observed  that "Al-
liances  are  nothing new in policymaking  ...
Without cooperation, the pursuit of self-inter-
est by each commodity  group  most probably
would  have brought an impasse  in farm bill
legislation." However, he concluded that these
efforts to keep everyone happy result in a fed-
eral farm policy that attempts to do too much.
Another explanation for government growth
set  forth by  the positivists  is  the Leviathan
model.  It  is  hypothesized  that  government
programs  exist  and  grow not because  of de-
mands  from citizens,  but rather  by demands
of government  bureaucrats  serving their own
interests.  Niskanen  argued that income,  rep-
utation,  and  power  of bureaucrats  are  posi-
tively correlated  with the size of the  agency.
Consequently,  they attempt to maximize  the
size of agency budgets.
Empirical  studies directed  at a study of the
Leviathan model have had mixed results. Based
on cross-section data on state revenues and tax
revenues  from  an international  sample  of 43
countries, Oates concluded in 1984 that "Per-
haps, after all, Leviathan is a mythical beast"
(p. 756). More recently, however, Zax did not
reject  the  Leviathan  model  on  the  basis  of
county data in the United States.
Testable Hypotheses
The reasons given in the literature for the ex-
istence  of government  logically  serve  as the
theoretical basis for explaining its size. That is
to say, the well-developed theoretical basis of
government in the economy yields testable hy-
potheses that serve to explain the level of state
government  activity in agriculture.
Keeping in mind the foregoing discussion of
the states' regulatory and service functions to
correct  externality  conditions  and  provide
public goods, it is expected that interstate dif-
ferences  in  agricultural  expenditures  are  a
function of the demand for these services and
the cost of providing them. Figure  1  illustrates
the relative positions in terms of expenditures
of departments  of agriculture  and gross farm
sales in each state surveyed.  (Expenditures for
California  and  Florida  were  too  high  to  fit
within the figure.)  The figure suggests, but it is
by no means apparent,  that state-by-state vari-
ations  in  agricultural  expenditures  are  posi-
tively related  to  the  size  of the  farm  sector
measured  by  gross  farm  sales.  Other  things
equal, a large farm  sector generates  more ex-
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Figure  1.  State gross farm sales and expenditures of state departments of agriculture
ternalities  that require public attention  and a
higher demand for government services. Also,
a large farm sector generates  greater political
clout that yields government  programs favor-
ing its own interests  such as state promotions
for local commodities.  Thus, state agricultural
expenditures  are expected to reflect the size of
the farm sector.
It is hypothesized that state agricultural  ex-
penditures also reflect the nature of farm pro-
duction  in each  state. This is particularly  rel-
evant  in  activities  that involve  grading  and
inspection  of agricultural commodities.  Little
empirical evidence exists, but discussions with
state agricultural  officials and examination  of
state documents  suggest that the grading and
inspection  of fruits  and  vegetables  is  more
costly than for other farm commodities.  This
is because fruit and  vegetable inspection  is a
relatively labor-intensive  process,  while sim-
ilar services  provided for grain producers,  for
example,  are  more  automated.  If this  is  the
case,  then those states  which produce  a high
volume  of fruits and vegetables  tend to have
larger  state  agricultural  budgets  than  other
states,  ceteris paribus.
The unresolved issue of the Leviathan ques-
tion  offers  another  possible  explanation  for
state  differences  in  agricultural  spending.  In
this regard it is hypothesized that those states
with large agricultural departments relative to
the rest of the state government will have larger
agricultural budgets,  ceteris paribus.
Finally, it is expected that the degree of ur-
banization  of a state has a bearing on agricul-
tural spending. Specifically, a highly urban state
with a small proportion of rural voters would
not be expected  to easily gather political sup-
port for programs  benefiting  farmers.  On the
other hand, earlier discussion in this article has
shown  that a  significant element  of state ag-
ricultural activity is consumer oriented. Hence,
urban residents receive benefits from agricul-
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Table  2.  Estimated  Spending,  Departments
of  Agriculture,  Selected  States,  Fiscal  Year
1985
Budget  Budget
State  ($000)  State  ($000)
Alabama  13,000  Nebraska  7,770
Arizona  9,045  Nevada  2,451
Arkansas  8,100  New Jersey  11,282
California  134,236  New Mexico  4,407
Colorado  9,598  New Yorkb  33,969
Connecticut  2,426  North  Carolina  35,678
Delaware  2,078  North Dakota  1,782
Florida  69,998  Ohio  13,180
Georgia  28,451  Oklahoma  13,723
Idaho  7,875  Oregon  13,650
Illinois  43,923  Pennsylvania  25,082
Kansas a 15,351  South Carolina  3,287
Kentucky  9,461  South Dakota  3,780
Louisiana  14,961  Tennessee  8,698
Maine  7,884  Texas  20,358
Maryland  18,330  Utah  6,000
Massachusetts  5,002  Virginia  25,945
Michiganb  42,006  Washington  20,000
Minnesota  27,817  West Virginia  7,463
Mississippi  12,890  Wisconsin  21,590
Missouri  12,970  Wyoming  4,489
Montana  2,423
a Includes federal  receipts.
bFiscal year  1986.
Source: Gunderson and Ospina.
effect  of  urbanization  on  state  agricultural
spending is an empirical  question.
Variables
Based on the previous considerations,  a rela-
tionship is defined to explain interstate differ-
ences in public expenditures in agriculture.  The
dependent variable  is estimated expenditures
of state departments  of agriculture 2 (table  2).
It is specified in two forms, total expenditures
(TOTSPD)  and  expenditures  per  farm
(SPDFRM).
There  are  five  explanatory  variables.  The
size  of the state  farm  sector is  measured  by
gross farm sales for  1982  (GRFMSAL) as  re-
2 State public funding in this article reflects direct commitments
to  agricultural  programs in  state  departments  of agriculture.  It
excludes programs not directly related to agriculture (for example,
canine control and port inspection). Also, since state contributions
to land grant schools, agricultural experiment stations, and exten-
sion  services  are  not considered  to  be a  part  of agriculture  de-
partment  budgets in any of the  states surveyed,  they are not in-
cluded in this analysis. Finally, federal contributions and commodity
check-off funds also are excluded from this analysis.
Table 3.  Estimated Influences
ricultural Spending
on  State Ag-
Explanatory  Equation (1)  Equation (2)
Variable  TOTSPD  SPDFRM
Constant  3,527.68  -198.67
GRFMSAL  6.16  -0.011
(8.87)*  (-.752)*
(.000)**  (.457)**
FR  UTVEG  686.93  25.44
(4.32)  (7.69)
(.000)  (000)
LEVIAT  115.50  -2.20
(.687)  (-.617)
(.497)  (.541)
MSA  287.01  5.24
(2.29)  (2.02)
(.028)  (.051)
TAXCAP  -315.58  1.78
(-1.55)  (.419)
(.130)  (.678)
2 = .76  R
2= .70
F=  26.72  F=  20.43
*  Indicates  t-statistic.
**  Indicates P-value or observed significance level for a two-tailed
test.
ported by the Census of Agriculture  (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce  1984).  The nature of
farm production  in the state  is estimated by
the percentage of each state's farm receipts that
are from fruit and vegetable sales (FR  UTVEG)
for 1985 (U.S. Department of Agriculture). The
ratio of agricultural expenditures to total state
expenditures in  1985 (LEVIAT),  an indicator
of concentration of state agricultural spending,
is used  as a proxy  for centralization  of gov-
ernment  in agriculture.  The  degree of urban-
ization in each state (MSA) is measured by the
percentage of state residents who lived in met-
ropolitan statistical areas in 1980 according to
the Census of Population (U.S. Department of
Commerce  1982). An additional  explanatory
variable,  the tax  capacity index  of the Advi-
sory  Commission  on  Intergovernmental  Re-
lations, is used as a proxy for budget constraint
(TAXCAP)  in each  state. This index is based
on how much revenue  a state could raise if it
taxed all bases-personal income, retail sales,
minerals-at the national average rate.
Empirical Results
Table  3 presents the results of two OLS equa-
tions that explain the  influences  on  state ag-
Ospina and GundersonWestern Journal of Agricultural Economics
ricultural spending. The dependent variable in
equation  (1)  is  total  agricultural  spending
(TOTSPD).  The  estimated  coefficients  indi-
cate that the  absolute  size of the farm  sector
(GRFMSAL) is, as expected, a predictor of to-
tal spending. In addition, the farm receipts mix
(FRUTVEG) is a highly  significant predictor
of  total agricultural spending. This implies that
governments  in states with a high proportion
of agricultural  production  in fruits  and vege-
tables  will have  greater  agricultural  expendi-
tures  compared  to those  states with  a lower
proportion,  all other things  equal. This is ex-
plained by the relatively costly government ac-
tivities associated with grading and inspecting
fruits and vegetables. Equally interesting is the
highly significant and positive relationship be-
tween total agricultural spending and the pro-
portion of the  state population  living in met-
ropolitan statistical areas (MSA). The provision
of consumer services, such as safe and health-
ful food supplies and protection from hazard-
ous  farm  chemicals,  encourages  urban  resi-
dents  to  support  agricultural  programs.  The
coefficients  of the budget  constraint  variable
(TAXCAP)  and the government centralization
variable  (LEVIAT)  are  not  significantly  dif-
ferent from zero.
Equation (2) shows the estimated influences
on state  agricultural  spending after  adjusting
it  by  the  number  of  farms  in  each  state
(SPDFRM). Somewhat  surprisingly,  the rela-
tion between  agricultural  spending  per  farm
and  the  absolute  size  of  the  farm  sector
(GRFMSAL) is not significant and has an un-
expected  negative  sign.3 The  influence  of
FRUTVEG on agricultural  spending per farm
is highly significant and positive as in equation
(1).  The  MSA  coefficient  is also  positive but
not different from zero at the .05  level of sig-
nificance.  Finally, the  TAXCAP and LEVIAT
coefficients are not significantly different from
zero.
Concluding  Remarks
These results  stand alone  in the field of agri-
cultural policy as  a model describing state ac-
tivity.  Nearly  all  previous agricultural  policy
3  Alternatively,  if the  influence of the  relative  size of the  farm
sector  (farm output  as  a  percentage  of gross  state  product)  on
SPDFRM  is tested, the results (not shown) indicate no significant
relation.
research has been directed  at federal  govern-
ment activities. In the current environment of
declining  federal  programs  and  budgets,  ad-
ditional attention needs to be directed to what
state governments  are accomplishing  in agri-
culture.
These results indicate, as expected from the
data presented in figure  1, that the total level
of state  agriculture  department  spending  is
positively related to the size of the farm sector.
This certainly  fulfills  the expectations  of the
normative  school  of public  policy  that state
agricultural  spending represents the provision
of public goods  and a reduction of the effects
of externalities  desired by the public.
One of the principal  models of the public
choice  theorists, the Leviathan  thesis,  argues
that  centralized  government  tends  to  grow
faster than decentralized  government.  The re-
sults of this study, based on the lack of signif-
icance  of the coefficient  of the  concentration
of agricultural  spending variable,  cast doubts
on  this  notion  in  state  departments  of agri-
culture.
This article  also  has identified  many gov-
ernment  agricultural  program  activities  that
benefit urban citizens. Thus, the MSA variable
was  included  in  the  regression  equations  to
reflect  the  influence  that  the  urban benefici-
aries of  agricultural spending may have through
the  voting and  legislative  processes.  The  re-
sults of this study support the voting models
of Downs and of Buchanan and Tullock who
have predicted that larger groups offer higher
benefits  for their members  because  increases
in voting power are associated with larger group
size.
Because  of the likelihood  that farm legisla-
tion  is influenced  by lobbyists,  it seems  ap-
propriate  to concentrate  on  lobby  groups  to
empirically test their significance. However,  it
is difficult to quantify the power of an interest
group. A strong lobby in a state may employ
only one or two individuals and be very  suc-
cessful, while a weak lobby may have amateur
lobbyists  promoting  its  cause  (Ziegler  and
Baer).
Finally,  this study admits to the shortcom-
ing that the  level of governmental  activity-
federal, state, local-is not fully reflected by a
simple tally of  total spending. Some of the most
important  areas  of government  intervention
are in the forms of  regulations which may cause
only modest amounts  of public  spending but
substantially  alter  economic  behavior.  The
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analysis  represents an initial inquiry into  the
nature and causes of state agricultural  spend-
ing.  The reduction  of federal government  ac-
tivism  in  agricultural  policy  and  programs
leaves  a void which  offers both opportunities
and challenges for the states.  Given the inter-
state differences in agricultural policy, further
efforts should be focused on study of these dif-
ferences and on assessing the effectiveness  of
programs.
[Received February  1989; final revision
received May 1990.]
References
Advisory  Commission  on Intergovernmental  Relations.
1981  Tax Capacity of the Fifty States. Washington
DC,  1983.
Batie,  S. S.  "Agriculture  as  the Problem:  The  Case  of
Groundwater."  Choices 4(3rd quarter  1988a):4-7.
"Political Economy of Rural Development: Dis-
cussion."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 70(1988b):1097-99.
Browne, W. P.  "Agricultural  Policy Can't Accommodate
All Who Want In." Choices  4(lst quarter 1989):9-11.
Buchanan,  J.  M., and G. Tullock.  The  Calculus of Con-
sent. Ann  Arbor MI:  University of Michigan  Press,
1962.
Chicoine,  D.  L.  "New  Federalism  and  Rural America:
Implications  for Local Public  Economies."  Amer.  J.
Agr. Econ. 70(1988):1085-90.
Connor, J. M.  Food  Processing.  Lexington MA: Lexington
Books,  1988.
Deaton, B. J., and T. J. Johnson.  "Attracting Value-Add-
ed Business:  Agricultural  Enterprise Development."
Lexington KY: Center for Agriculture and Rural Pol-
icy, The Council of State Governments,  Tech. Assist.
Bull. No.  6, 1988.
Downs, A.  An Economic Theory of  Democracy. New York:
Harper and Row,  1957.
Gunderson,  R.  0., and  E.  Ospina.  "The  Role of State
Government  in Agriculture."  In  The Role of State
Government in Agriculture, eds.,  E. Ospina and C. S.
Sims, pp. 3-49. Morrilton AR: Winrock Internation-
al,  1988.
Jacobs, J.  J., and D. T. Taylor.  "The Increasing Role of
States  in Water  Management:  The  Wyoming  Expe-
rience."  West. J. Agr. Econ.  14(1989):261-67.
Jahr,  D.  "Rural  Concerns  and  the National  Policy En-
vironment." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 70(1988):1078-84.
McLemore,  L. A.  "The States' Role in Agricultural Mar-
keting: Innovative Strategies." Lexington KY: Center
for Agriculture and Rural Policy, The Council of State
Governments,  Tech. Assist. Bull. No.  5, 1988.
Niskanen,  W.  A.,  Jr.  Bureaucracy and Representative
Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton,  1971.
Nothdurft,  W. E.,  R. J.  Vaughan,  and M.  G.  Popovich.
"Creating an Entrepreneurial Farm Economy: A New
State Policy Approach."  Washington DC: Council of
State  Policy and Planning Agencies,  1986.
Oates,  W.  E.  "Searching  for  Leviathan:  An  Empirical
Study."  Amer. Econ. Rev.  75(1985):748-57.
Popovich,  M. G.  "State Agricultural Export  Promotion
Strategies:  A  Review  of Selected  State  Programs."
Washington DC: Council of State Policy and Planning
Agencies,  April  1988.
. "State  Emergency  Farm  Finance:  A  Review."
Washington DC: Council of  State Policy and Planning
Agencies,  January  1986.
Rabe, B.  C.  "Toward  the Next Federalism."  Forum  for
Applied Research and Public Policy 3(Fall  1988):5-
15.
Runge,  C.  F.  "State-level Agricultural  Policy in Minne-
sota: Adjusting to Change in the  1980s."  In The Role
of State Government in Agriculture, eds.,  E. Ospina
and C. S. Sims, pp.  133-45. Morrilton AR:  Winrock
International,  1988.
Smith, S. N.  "The Changing Role  of State Governments
in Rural  Development."  In  The Role of State Gov-
ernment in  Agriculture, eds., E. Ospina and C. S. Sims,
pp.  75-97.  Morrilton  AR:  Winrock  International,
1988.
Tullock, G.  "Problems of  Majority Voting." J. Polit. Econ.
67(1959):571-79.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Economic Research Ser-
vice.  Economic Indicators  of the Farm Sector: State
Income and  Balance  Sheet Statistics. Washington DC:
Government  Printing Office,  1985.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Census.  1980
U.S. Census ofPopulation. Washington DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office,  1982.
.Bureau of Census.  1982 U.S.  Census of Agricul-
ture. Washington  DC:  Government  Printing Office,
1984.
White,  F. C.  "The Role of State Government  Agencies
in Farm Financing." In The Role of  State Government
in Agriculture, eds.,  E.  Ospina  and C.  S. Sims,  pp.
115-31. Morrilton AR: Winrock International,  1988.
Zax, J. S.  "Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?"
Amer. Econ. Rev. 79(1989):560-67.
Ziegler, H.,  and M. Baer.  Lobbying: Interaction  and In-
fluence in American State Legislatures. Belmont CA:
Wadsworth,  1969.
Ospina and Gunderson